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1 Introduction
Risk-averse consumers demand health insurance because medical expenses are
uncertain. They pay a premium before the realization of the risk and they
receive an indemnity if the illness occurs. The consumer’s health status is not
perfectly observable by the insurer, as a result the indemnity is generally directly
related to the health care costs. Thus, health insurance covers the financial risk
associated with buying medical care.
This paper focuses on the relationship between insurers and consumers when
insurers are both private and public. In particular it analyses the eﬀect of ex-
post moral hazard on the demand for care when consumers are covered by a
mixed insurance scheme. The mixed system explicitly considered in this paper
is the topping-up scheme (as opposed to the opting-out) which is actually the
most widespread system in developed countries.1 This system is characterized
by public insurance covering a part of the individuals’ health expenditure (a
package of essentials), and a voluntary private policy topping up the remaining
services.
As is it is generally known, ex-post moral-hazard is a consequence of health
insurance: insurance coverage reduces the marginal price of care and induces
additional consumption. This ineﬃciency is obviously increased by the pres-
ence of supplementary coverage because the latter reduces the marginal price of
care even more. Since the mid-1980s developed countries have significantly and
progressively increased the role of voluntary insurance in their health systems,
and some authors are skeptical about the way private policies have been intro-
duced and mixed schemes have been structured. In particular Blomqvist and
Johansson (1997), Selden (1997), Pauly (2000) argue that private supplemen-
tary coverage can have spillover eﬀects, increasing the cost of public coverage.
But none of these authors has analyzed in detail the ineﬃciency induced by
mixed health insurance coverage. This paper tries to fill this gap showing how,
in equilibrium, the public policy changes when public and private insurers move
simultaneously or sequentially. In particular, when the firms play simultane-
ously, both coverages are positive and the standard ineﬃciency of Nash equi-
libria is retrieved; whereas, when the firms play sequentially, the public insurer
provides zero coverage and the second-best allocation is implemented.
As empirical evidence has shown in the case of the Medicare program in the
US and of French mixed coverage (Wolfe and Goddeeris (1991), Ettner (1997)
and Henriet and Rochet (1998)), another important problem connected with
currently available mixed systems is that supplementary insurance is purchased
by wealthier consumers. In particular, in many developed countries public cov-
erage is uniform and limited and richer people complement public insurance
with private coverage. As a result, supplementary insurance can seriously aﬀect
horizontal equity.
A recent literature has analyzed mixed insurance schemes in order to inves-
1The countries in which the opting-out system has developed are Germany, Ireland and
the Netherlands. Most other countries are characterized by the topping-up system: Finland,
France, Belgium, Sweden, the UK, the US, Canada and Australia.
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tigate whether providing public coverage when consumers can supplement in
the private market is eﬃcient. Rochet (1991), Cremer and Pestieau (1996) and
Henriet and Rochet (1998) have showed that, without ex-post moral hazard,
public coverage is welfare improving if public insurance redistributes both from
the rich to the poor and from the low- to the high-risk, that is if the correlation
between wage rates and morbidity is negative. Petretto (1999) and Boadway et
al. (2001) and (2004) have extended the previous models to the case of ex-post
moral hazard (and, for the last work, adverse selection in the insurance market).
The result is now ambiguous: the public insurer may want to set either a tax or
a subsidy on health care expenses. Only with quasi-linear utility functions and
for a suﬃciently high negative correlation between wage rates and morbidity,
Boadway et al. (2001) and (2004) have found that a positive public coverage is
welfare improving.
Some important questions are still open. Let us assume that the correlation
between wage rates and morbidity is not suﬃciently high such that a positive
public coverage is not welfare improving, as according to the above mentioned
literature. In this case, how does moral hazard aﬀect the optimal public and
private coverage? Which are the consequences of mixed coverage on redistri-
bution? In order to provide an answer to these questions, this work focuses
on moral hazard only and considers heterogenous individuals: low- and high-
revenue consumers. It is shown that, when moral hazard is suﬃciently high, the
rich buy more private coverage, and thus over-consume more than the poor. As
a consequence, when the two firms play sequentially, the optimal public cover-
age is negative: health care consumption must be taxed to discourage private
policy purchase.
Moreover, this model shows how reverse redistribution in public health care
financing can arise. Let us assume that institutional and/or political constraints
on public policy exist such that the public insurer cannot internalize that con-
sumers also buy the private policy and always supplies a positive public coverage.
In addition to this, let us assume that the level of ex post moral hazard is suﬃ-
ciently high. The result is that the rich net contribution to health care financing
is lower than the poor one, where net contribution is the fiscal revenue raised
from a group minus the health care subsidy paid to such a group.
The plan of this paper is as follows. In section 2 consumers are identical.
First, a graphical representation of moral hazard and its eﬀects on expected con-
sumption is proposed (section 2.1). Second, the consequences of moral hazard
are analyzed when the public insurer is myopic and does not internalize the eﬀect
of private coverage on treatment consumption (section 2.2). Third, in sections
2.3 and 2.4, the equilibrium policies are derived when the public insurer and
the private one move simultaneously (Nash equilibrium), and when the public
insurer plays the role of the Stackelberg leader (sub-game perfect equilibrium)
respectively. In section 3 consumers’ heterogeneity is introduced: individuals
diﬀer in their wage rate and labor supply is endogenous. Section 3.3 considers
the case for reverse redistribution when the public insurer is myopic. Finally,
in section 3.4 the equilibrium policies are derived when the public insurer plays
the role of the Stackelberg leader. Section 4 concludes.
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2 The model with identical consumers
In the following model a part of individuals’ health expenditure is covered by
public insurance, a part by private insurance, and the last part is out-of-pocket.
In this section consumers are identical and have mass 1. Their state-independent
utility is a function of health, the benefits of the health care received, and the
income available to be spent on other goods after the cost of treatment has been
deducted. In this section income W is exogenous. Consumers are ill with prob-
ability p.When ill, they are subject to a negative health shock whose monetary
equivalent is h¯. Health can be recovered according to a strictly concave function
h(x) representing the monetary benefits from health care consumption, where
x denotes the quantity of treatment. h is increasing in x, and ranges from 0 to
h¯. The marginal productivity of x is decreasing and the third derivative of h is
positive. The lower bound of x is zero and its upper bound is set at x¯ such that
h0(x¯) = 0.2 The standard assumption is that h(x) < h¯ for every possible level of
treatment consumption. Nevertheless, in this paper let us assume that h(x¯) = h¯,
that is the upper bound for treatment implies complete recovery. This allows to
compare the first-best allocation (full-insurance with eﬃcient consumption) to
the allocation with full coverage and maximal overconsumption (full-insurance
with the highest moral hazard level).
To make it simple, it is assumed that technology for medical treatment is
linear and subject to constant returns to scale. Marginal cost is constant and
normalized at one. Consumers directly purchase on the market the chosen
quantity of treatment, which implies that the physician is acting as a perfect
agent for his patients.
Using a strictly concave function U (·) to represent the risk-averse consumers’
preferences, the expected utility without any insurance is:3
EU = pU
£
W − x− h¯+ h (x)
¤
+ (1− p)U (W ) (1)
Henceforth aggregate consumption in ill and in healthy states is denoted as CI
and C0 respectively. The indiﬀerence curves represent combinations of wealth
in the two states of nature which yield constant expected utility. Indiﬀerence
curves have slope dCodCH = −
1−p
p
U0(C0)
U 0(CI)
. From the consumer’s budget constraint,
whose slope is −1−pp , expected aggregate consumption is W −p
£
x+ h¯− h (x)
¤
.
Let us define the net monetary loss due to illness as X, where X ≡ x+h¯−h (x) .
When the consumer is not insured, he chooses his treatment consumption
according to the first-order condition:
h0(x) = 1 (2)
2An upper bound on treatment can be justified by limits on care imposed either by insurers,
the government, or providers. Also there may be levels of care beyond which health no longer
improves. (Selden 1993)
3The same model is used in Barigozzi (2003) to analyze secondary prevention reimburse-
ment. In that model the health recovery function h(·) depends both on treatment and sec-
ondary prevention.
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Since in the previous expression the marginal cost and the marginal benefit
of treatment are equalized, from now on the amount of treatment verifying
equation (2) will be referred as xFB. Such an amount is the eﬃcient one, in
fact, as it will be shown in few lines, it corresponds to the first-best consumption.
Notice that there is no income eﬀect in (2), treatment demand only depends on
consumption price.
Before analyzing a standard insurance contract with co-payment, it is useful
to consider the first-best allocation of this simple model. First-best insurance
can be implemented when the insurance firm perfectly observes the consumer’s
state of health, in this case it can oﬀer two monetary transfers contingent upon
disease: a lump-sum contract. The consumer receive TI in case of illness and
T0 when healthy, where pTI + (1− p)T0 = 0. The first-best program is:


max
TI ,T0,x
EU = pU
£
W + TI − x− h¯+ h (x)
¤
+ (1− p)U (W + T0)
s.t. : pTI + (1− p)T0 = 0
(FB1)
Such a contract leads to full insurance
¡
CI = C0 = CFB
¢
. As it is generally
known, in full insurance the indiﬀerence curves are tangent to the budget
constraint. With first-best insurance treatment price is not distorted and con-
sumers choose the eﬃcient quantity of treatment xFB. This implies that, in
first-best, aggregate consumption is CFB = W − p
£
xFB + h¯− h (xFB)
¤
=
W − pXFB .
In figure 1 the two axes respectively indicate aggregate consumption when
the consumer is healthy (C0) and when she is sick (CI). In the figure the no-
insurance and the first-best allocations are shown. Notice that, in the figure,
the net monetary loss XFB = xFB + h¯ − h (xFB) can be directly read on the
vertical axis.
Insert figure 1 about here
Let us assume, now, that the illness status is not perfectly observable either by
public or private insurers. As a consequence all insurers oﬀer a contract where
the indemnity is directly related to the health care costs. Notice that, in order to
obtain reimbursement, consumers must generally show to the insurer a doctor’s
certification or a hospital/doctor’s bill. As a consequence, it is reasonable to
assume that health care consumption is ex-post verifiable such that non-linear
contracts could be analyzed. Nevertheless, for the sake of tractability, in this
paper linear contracts will be analyzed.
2.1 With one coverage only: the second-best
First of all, let us consider the case where only the public insurer oﬀers a con-
tract to consumers. The public contract is denoted as (T, α) , where T is the
actuarially fair public premium (T = pαx) and α is a cost-sharing parameter.
Hence, (1− α) is consumers’ out-of-pocket expense when they buy one unit of
treatment. With the contract (T, α) , consumers’ expected utility becomes:
EU = pU
£
W − T − (1− α)x− h¯+ h (x)
¤
+ (1− p)U (W − T ) (3)
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When choosing treatment quantity x∗, consumers take the premium T and the
cost-sharing parameter α as given, such that:
x∗ = x (α) : h0(x) = 1− α (4)
When the cost-sharing parameter α is positive, the consumption price for treat-
ment decreases. This implies that x∗ > xFB : overconsumption of treatment
arises. Here it is the problem of ex-post moral hazard in health insurance.4
Moreover, by diﬀerentiating (4) it follows that ∂x∂α = −
1
h00(x) > 0.
5 Thus, the
higher is insurance coverage, the higher is over-consumption.
With a slight abuse of language, from now on ∂x∂α will be often referred as
the level of moral hazard induced by the insurance coverage α.
In order to optimally choose T and α, the public insurer takes into account
the choice of treatment made by consumers and solves the following program:



max
T,α
EU = pU
£
W − T − (1− α)x− h¯+ h (x)
¤
+ (1− p)U (W − T )
s.t. : T = pαx
h0(x) = 1− α
Treatment demand does not depend either on revenue or on aggregate consump-
tion in the illness status, therefore substituting the budget constraint into the
public insurer’s objective function, the previous program can be rewritten as:



max
α
EU = pU
£
W − pαx− (1− α)x− h¯+ h (x)
¤
+ (1− p)U (W − pαx)
s.t. : h0(x) = 1− α
(P1)
From the first order condition with respect to α, an implicit expression for the
cost-sharing parameter in second-best can be found:
αSB =
(1− p)x [U 0(CI)− U 0(C0)]
∂x
∂αE [U
0(C)]
(5)
Where E [U 0(C)] ≡ pU 0(CI) + (1− p)U 0(C0) is expected marginal aggregate
consumption.6
Definition 1 εx,α ≡ ∂x∂α
α
x > 0 is the coverage elasticity of treatment demand.
4A number of empirical studies have analyzed the impact of cost-sharing on the consump-
tion of health care. Since insurance is thought to induce demand for health care by reducing
its marginal price, the price elasticity of demand for care is directly relevant to the moral
hazard eﬀect. To date, the most important empirical study is The Rand Health Insurance
Experiment which estimated the elasticity of demand at -0.2 (Manning et al. (1987))
5See also the first lines of appendix 1.
6Notice that, because of moral-hazard, neither α = 0 nor α = 1 are possible solutions for
equation (5). In fact for α = 0 it is CI =W − xFB − h¯+ h (xFB) =W −XFB and C0 =W,
such that C0 > CI . While for α = 1 CI = W − T − h¯+ h (x¯) = W − px¯ and C0 = W − px¯
such that CI = C0 = CFI , where FI stands for full-insurance.
6
Definition 2 π(x) ≡ −xh
000(x)
h00(x) > 0.
7
Lemma 1 (Concavity): a suﬃcient condition for problem P1 to be concave
in α is εx,α > 1p (π(x))
−1.
Proof. See the appendix 5.1.
Notice that the suﬃcient condition in lemma 1 implies that problem P1 is
well-behaved when moral hazard is suﬃciently high.
Lemma 2 (Second-best): when only one firm provides coverage, the second-
best allocation is obtained. The second-best coverage αSB is positive and lower
than one. Moreover, the lower is moral-hazard, and the higher is consumer’s
risk aversion, the higher is αSB.
Proof. In general no over-insurance (α > 1) can arise because for x > x¯ the
marginal benefit from treatment becomes negative, then C0 ≥ CI and U 0(CI)−
U 0(C0) ≥ 0 holds. The higher is risk aversion, the higher is the diﬀerence
between the two marginal utilities. Moreover, ∂x∂α > 0, such that the cost-
sharing parameter α is positive.
Now let us examine the consequence of moral hazard on consumers’ expected
aggregate consumption.
Remark 1 Under ex-post moral hazard, the insurance coverage reduces con-
sumers’ expected aggregate consumption.
Proof. Under the contract (T, α), consumers’ expected aggregate consumption
becomes W − p
£
x∗ + h¯− h (x∗)
¤
=W − pX∗. Whereas, without any insurance
coverage, expected aggregate consumption is W − pXFB. The function h(·) is
concave and x∗ > xFB, thus X∗ = x∗+ h¯−h (x∗) > XFB = xFB + h¯−h (xFB)
and W − pX∗ < W − pXFB.
Remark 1 implies that the consumers’ budget constraint shifts down when
insurance coverage is purchased. Figure 1 shows the new budget constraint and
the consumers’ allocation (the second-best) under the contract (T,α) .
The following equation, directly coming from (5), can be interpreted in term
of the trade-oﬀ between risk-spreading and eﬃciency:
εx,α∗ =
(1− p) [U 0(CI)− U 0(C0)]
E [U 0(C)]
(6)
The consumer, moving to the left on his budget constraint, reaches partial
insurance and his utility increases. On the other hand, the coverage α leads to
over-consumption: aggregate consumption decreases and the budget constraint
moves down; as a result, consumers’ utility falls. The optimal cost-sharing
parameter α is such that the marginal benefit (the right hand side of (6)) and
7The function π(x) ≡ −xh
000(x)
h00(x) recalls the index of relative prudence for the utility func-
tions. The economic interpretation in term of the recovery function h(x) is diﬃcult to estab-
lish.
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the marginal cost of insurance coverage (the left hand side of (6)) are equalized.
Obviously, in second-best the consumers’ utility is lower than in first-best, but
it is higher than in the absence of insurance.
It is now interesting to compare consumers’ expected utility with no-insurance
(α = 0) and in the full-coverage case (α = 1) . In fact, if moral hazard is suf-
ficiently high (in other words if X¯ = x¯ + h¯ − h (x¯) = x¯ is suﬃciently larger
than XFB), and/or the consumer’s risk aversion is suﬃciently low, consumers
prefer no-insurance to full-coverage as in figure 2. In other words, the cost of
moral hazard in terms of the fall of expected aggregate consumption completely
overcomes the benefit from insurance.
Insert figure 2 about here
Definition 3 c(L,U) is the certainty equivalent of lottery L given utility U(·),where
lottery L represents the no-insurance case and it is shown in figure 3.
Remark 2 Given the level of moral hazard, there is a U(·) such that c(L,U) >
W − pX¯ always holds. Alternately, given the utility function U(·), c(L,U) >
W − pX¯ holds if moral hazard is suﬃciently high.
Proof. In the full-insurance case α = 1 and x = x¯ such that T = px¯. Aggregate
consumption in the two states of nature becomes CI = C0 = CFI = W − px¯,
where FI stands for full-insurance. Consumers’ utility is U(W − px¯) = U(W −
pX¯). On the contrary, with no-insurance consumers face the lottery L and
expected utility is given by pU
£
W − x− h¯+ h (x)
¤
+(1− p)U (W ). Consumers
prefer no-insurance to full-coverage if:
pU
£
W − x− h¯+ h (x)
¤
+ (1− p)U (W ) > U(W − pX¯)
which is equivalent to write:
c(L,U) > W − pX¯
and which means that consumers prefer the lottery L to the certain amount
W −pX¯. Recalling that the lower is risk aversion, the higher is c(L,U); whereas
the higher is moral hazard, the lower is U(W−pX¯), remark 2 can be established.
Some comparative statics concerning the cost-sharing parameter will be par-
ticularly useful in section 3.
Remark 3 (Insurance coverage as a normal good) U 000 (·) < 0 is a suﬃ-
cient condition for insurance coverage to be a normal good. Whereas, if U 000 (·) >
0, a necessary condition is:
C.1 : εx,α >
(1− p) [U 00(CI)− U 00(C0)]
E [U 00(C)]
If U 000 (·) > 0 and the opposite of C.1 holds, than insurance coverage is an
inferior good.
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Proof. See the appendix 5.2.
The standard assumption in Decision Theory is that U 000 (·) > 0. Without
moral hazard, when marginal utility is convex, the higher is consumers’ rev-
enue and the lower are risk-aversion and the demand for insurance. In fact, the
lower is the revenue, the higher is marginal utility from increasing aggregate
consumption in the ”bad” state of nature. For this reason insurance is gener-
ally considered an ”inferior good”. On the contrary, concerning supplementary
insurance, as mentioned in the introduction, empirical evidence shows that the
rich buy more private coverage than the poor. The previous remark explains
why. When moral hazard is suﬃciently high, insurance becomes a normal good.
In fact, a high level of moral hazard implies that an increase in coverage leads
to a large increase in premium. The premium is paid in both states of nature
and, when it is high, it brings to an important fall in expected aggregate con-
sumption. In such a case, the lower is the revenue, the higher is the marginal
cost from decreasing aggregate consumption in both states of nature.
On the contrary, when U 000 (·) < 0, marginal utility is concave such that
the higher is consumers’ revenue, the higher are risk-aversion and the demand
for insurance. Thus, whatever the level of moral hazard, the rich buy more
insurance coverage than the poor.
Later on the standard case U 000 (·) > 0 will be considered.
2.2 Public and private coverage when the public insurer
is myopic
Let us assume that, in a second stage, private firms oﬀer a contracts (P, β)
where P is the premium and β is the cost-sharing parameter. And let us assume
that the private market is competitive so that insurance firms make zero profit
and the premium P is actuarially fair. Later on, for the sake of exposition,
the representative firm in the insurance market will be referred as the private
insurer.
First of all, let us consider the case where the public insurer is myopic, that
means it does not anticipate that the consumer will buy a private coverage. The
public insurer’s myopia can be motivated by several political or institutional
constraints which are not internalized in this simple model but seem important
in reality. For example, as shown in section 3.4, when the public insurer moves
the first, it would be optimal to impose a negative public coverage (to tax health
care consumption). In the real world, it would be really hard for the government
to obtain the political agreement to implement such a policy.
With mixed coverage, consumers’ expected utility becomes:
pU
£
W − T − P − (1− α− β)x− h¯+ h (x)
¤
+ (1− p)U (W − T − P )
Now, the purchased quantity of treatment x∗∗ is determined by:
x∗∗ = x (α+ β) : h0(x) = 1− α− β (7)
When the public insurer is myopic, it solves problem (P1) as in the previous
section. Whereas the private insurer always takes both T and α as given. In
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particular, in the case where the public insurer is myopic and also in the case
where it acts strategically (both when the public firm has the first mover’s
advantage and when the two firms play simultaneously), the private firm always
solves problem (P2) as below.



max
P,β
pU
£
W − T − P − (1− α− β)x− h¯+ h (x)
¤
+ (1− p)U (W − T − P )
s.t. : P = pβx
h0(x) = 1− α− β
(P2)
Substituting the premium P in the objective function and rearranging the first-
order condition with respect to β, it follows:
pxU 0(CI)− p
µ
x+ β
∂x
∂β
¶
E [U 0(C)] = 0 (8)
where x, CI and C0 depend, now, on the mixed coverage. Rearranging (8) it
is possible to calculate the derivative of the consumer’s expected utility with
respect to β when β = 0 :
∂EU
∂β
¯¯¯¯
β=0
= p (1− p)x [U 0(CI)− U 0(C0)] > 0. (9)
Remark 4 Given a level of coverage, consumers are better oﬀ if they can buy
some more coverage from another firm.
Considering the consumer’s point of view, this shows that, once the public
contract (α, T ) is established, a positive private coverage is welfare-improving.
A new contract, which brings the consumer into the shadow area of figure 2,
increases his expected utility.
As shown in sections 2.3, a mixed coverage with both α and β non-negative
is ineﬃcient. Nevertheless, remark 4 holds because in program (P2) the public
premium T is considered as given. In particular, the private insurer does not
internalize that an increase in β makes treatment demand increase which, in
tour, makes the public premium T raise. Thus, aggregate consumption decreases
in both states of nature. As a result, too much coverage is oﬀered by the private
firm and a negative externality on the public insurer’s contract is produced.
Later on it will be referred to as premium externality.8
Solving (8) for β, the following expression (equivalent to 5) follows for the
private coverage:
β =
(1− p)x [U 0(CI)− U 0(C0)]
∂x
∂βE [U
0(C)]
(11)
8Notice that, if the premium externality is internalized, first-order condition (8) becomes:
pxU 0(CI)− p
µ
x+ β
∂x
∂β
+ α
∂x
∂β
¶
E
£
U 0(C)
¤
= 0 (10)
Given that ∂x
∂β
= ∂x
∂α
, from (10) and setting β = 0 it follows an expression equivalent to the
first-order condition of problem (P1). Thus, as expected, ∂EU
∂β
¯¯¯
β=0
= 0 is obtained.
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Proceeding as in the previous section, private coverage is positive and the fol-
lowing remark can be established:
Remark 5 When the public insurer is myopic and, at the same time, the pri-
vate insurer provides coverage, 0 < αSB < αSB + β < 1 holds. Moreover, the
lower is moral-hazard, and the higher is consumer’s risk aversion, the higher is
αSB + β.
Proof. The proof comes directly from the public insurer’s myopia, from lemma
2 and from remark 4.
With the private coverage β, the marginal cost of treatment decreases, it
follows that x∗∗ > x∗ : over-consumption increases and the consumers’ budget
constraint shifts down even more.
When the public insurer is myopic, an important point concerns the exter-
nality inflicted on the public insurer by private coverage: later on it will be
referred as coverage externality in order to distinguish it from the premium
externality. In its program (P1) the public insurer does not anticipate the ef-
fects of private coverage on consumers’ choice. In particular the premium T is
calculated upon x∗ while, under mixed coverage, the expected consumption is
pαx∗∗ > T = pαx∗. Thus, the public premium T does not pay the public insurer
for the expected cost of treatment: the public insurer makes negative profits. In
particular the public insurer faces a budget deficit equal to pα (x∗∗ − x∗). Notice
that C0 =W −T −P and CI =W −T −P −(1− α− β)x∗∗− h¯+h (x∗∗) where
T = pαx∗ and P = pβx∗∗. As a result, consumers’ expected aggregate consump-
tion with mixed coverage is W − pX∗∗ + pα (x∗∗ − x∗) instead of W − pX∗∗,
and the budget constraint moves down less than it should.
Remark 6 When the public firm is myopic, consumers’ expected aggregate con-
sumption increases of the amount pα (x∗∗ − x∗). Such an amount corresponds
to a public budget deficit.
The previous environment could describe some mixed insurance schemes
implemented in the real world, the French system being a prime example9, to-
gether with Medicare and Medigap coverage in the US. In these mixed insurance
schemes all consumers, those who buy private coverage and those who do not,
receive the same public coverage 0 < α < 1.
In the real world full-coverage (β = 1− α) is frequent (third payer principle):
access to care is completely free for consumers who choose the maximum amount
of treatment x¯. Notice that, under the assumption h(x¯) = h¯, equation (11) is
never satisfied for β = 1 − α. Free access to care can arise only if complete
recovery is never reached and CI < C0 for every treatment consumption level.
In this case it is possible that β = 1−α verifies (11). Let us assume for a moment
that h(x¯) < h¯ and CI < C0 always holds, assuming also that β = 1 − α is the
9The “ticket modérateur” (1−α) has always played a great role throughout the history of
French health insurance scheme. However, 83% of the population have private insurance that
pays all or part of patients’ share of the costs, thus lessening its impact.
11
solution of problem (P2). Then, private firms set the premium P = p (1− α) x¯,
and the public insurer’s deficit reaches its maximum amount: pα (x¯− x∗) .
Let us assume that the scenario with a myopic public insurer depicts mixed
health insurance schemes as they are sometimes available in the real world. The
analysis in this section shows that the problem with supplementary insurance
is not just that it leads to more overconsumption of care. More important is
the coverage externality that can raise with respect to the public insurer. Such
a coverage externality makes consumers better oﬀ (at least in the short run),
as stated by remark 6. If the public contract is not accurately modified, the
introduction of supplementary private coverage leads to public deficit, a prob-
lem the governments are extremely concerned about and which, paradoxically,
has motivated the introduction of a private policy. In fact, in the last decade,
fiscal pressure has led many governments to reduce public coverage such that
consumers’ out-of-pockets expenses for health care increased. In many coun-
tries private supplementary coverage is now considered a valuable instrument
to smooth consumption in diﬀerent health status.
2.3 Simultaneous game
Showing a private insurer’s program similar to P2 where they added the con-
dition for the balance of the public insurer’s budget, Blomqvist and Johansson
(1997, page 512) claim that “mixed equilibrium leads to lower welfare than the
second-best equilibrium”. Thus, they refer to the game where the public and
the private insurer play simultaneously; anyway they do not solve the model
and the ineﬃciency of mixed coverage is not analyzed in detail. This analysis
is the aim of this section.
As previously explained, consumers and private firms’ programs are not af-
fected by the way the public and the private insurer compete. Thus, (7) always
describes consumers’ choice. Assuming that a large number of competitive pri-
vate firms and the public insurer simultaneously choose the premium and the
cost-sharing parameter, the public insurer solves the following program:



max
T,α
p
£
U (W − T − P − (1− α− β)x)− h¯+ h (x)
¤
+ (1− p)U (W − T − P )
s.t. : T = pαx
h0(x) = 1− α− β
(P3)
Whereas private firms still solve Programs P2.
As already established, under the assumption h(x¯) = h¯, moral hazard im-
plies that full coverage is never an equilibrium and α+ β < 1 necessarily holds.
Using the terminology of Industrial Organization, private and public coverage
are expected to be strategic substitutes : ∂
2EU
∂α∂β < 0. This implies that when α (re-
spectively β) increases, private coverage (respectively public coverage) becomes
less attractive for consumers.
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Remark 7 When the condition in lemma 1 holds, εx,α > 1p is a suﬃcient
condition for public and private coverage to be strategic substitutes.
Proof. See the appendix 5.3.
Notice that when π(x) is lower than one, the condition in remark 7 implies
the condition in lemma 1, otherwise the condition in lemma 1 is suﬃcient both
for concavity and strategic substitutability between public and private cover-
age.10
According to remark 4, given one coverage, expected utility increases when
another coverage is added. Thus, in the symmetric Nash equilibrium (αN , βN ),
both private and public coverage are positive. All the considerations made
before regarding the optimal coverage still hold such that αN and βN are lower
than one. Moreover, given that the two coverages are strategic substitutes,
αN = βN < αSB holds.
From the first-order conditions of programs (P2) and (P3) it follows:
FOC (α) : U 0(CI)x =
µ
x+ α
∂x
∂α
¶
E [U 0(C)] (12)
FOC (β) : U 0(CI)x =
µ
x+ β
∂x
∂β
¶
E [U 0(C)] (13)
where the left-hand sides of (12) and (13) represent marginal benefit and the
right-hand sides marginal cost from an increase in coverage. In fact, a higher
coverage leads to more treatment consumption and more recovery in the illness
status (left-hand sides), and it leads to less aggregated consumption in both
states of nature because the insurance premium increases (right-hand sides).
First-order conditions (12) and (13) show that here two premium external-
ities arise: the public firm does not take into account that α also aﬀects the
premium of the private contract through treatment consumption, and the pri-
vate firm does not take into account that β also aﬀects the premium of the
public contract. When the premium externalities are internalized, first-order
conditions become:
FOC∗ (α) : U 0(CI)x =
µ
x+ α
∂x
∂α
¶
E [U 0(C)] + β
∂x
∂α
E [U 0(C)] (14)
FOC∗ (β) : U 0(CI)x =
µ
x+ β
∂x
∂β
¶
E [U 0(C)] + α
∂x
∂β
E [U 0(C)] (15)
Marginal costs in (12) and (13) are lower than in (14) and (15), showing that
the two firms under-estimate the eﬀect of their strategies on expected utility.
Thus, aggregate coverage
³
αN + βN
´
is higher than the second-best coverage
αSB.
Proposition 1 When consumers are homogeneous and public and private firms
simultaneously choose insurance coverage, 0 < αN = βN < αSB and αN+βN >
αSB : consumers are over-insured.
10For the logaritmic function, π (x) is equal to 1 and the two conditions are equivalent.
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Proof. The proof results from all the previous discussion.
Here the standard ineﬃciency in Nash equilibria can be retrieved.
2.4 Sequential game
It is plausible to assume that the public insurer can credibly commit to ignore
whatever strategy of the private one. Then, analyzing the sequential game
between the two firms, it is reasonable to attribute the first-mover advantage to
the public insurer.
The timing of the game is as follows: in stage 1 the public insurer chooses
its policy (T, α) without observing either consumers’ demand for treatment or
private coverage. The public insurer anticipates the eﬀect of its policies both on
the insurance market and on consumers’ behavior. In stage 2 the competitive
insurance industry sells contracts (P, β) to consumers. Profits are zero such
that the premium P is fair. In this stage, (T,α) are considered as given and
consumers’ behavior is correctly anticipated. In stage 3 consumers choose the
treatment quantity given (T, P, α, β). The equilibrium is assumed to be sub-
game perfect, so let us solve it by backward induction.
Proposition 2 When consumers are homogeneous and the public firm has the
first-mover’s advantage, public coverage is set at zero. Private coverage corre-
sponds to the second-best coverage.
Proof. See the appendix 5.4.
The intuition for the previous proposition is as follows. How it was empha-
sized by remark (4), whatever is the timing of the game, the premium externality
arises because the private firm takes (T, α) as given. Thus, even if the public
insurer correctly anticipates consumers’ behavior, when a positive public cov-
erage is oﬀered, the premium externality always leads to over-insurance with
respect to the second-best. The second-best allocation can be obtained only if
the public coverage is zero. In other words, the public insurer anticipates that
the private firm reaction function is given by (13); by setting α = 0 the premium
externality is completly internalized and (13) and (15) are equivalent.
3 Consumers’ heterogeneity
In order to investigate the redistributive implications of supplementary insur-
ance under moral hazard, consumer’s heterogeneity is here introduced with re-
spect to wage rates. Consumers are characterized by two diﬀerent productivity
levels and their expected utility now is:
pU
£
wili − xi − h¯+ h (xi)− v(li)
¤
+ (1− p)U [wili − v(li)]
where i = L,H and wH > wL are the wage rates. The proportion of high- and
low-income individuals in this economy is respectively λH and λL = 1 − λH .
The function v(·) represents disutility from labor supply li and is increasing
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and strictly convex. Given that no adverse selection is considered, in order to
simplify the notation high and low income groups are characterized by the same
risk of illness p. Moreover, when they are ill, they suﬀer the same exogenous
monetary loss h¯ and they benefit from health care consumption according to
the same function h (xi).
The public insurer does not observe either consumers’ health status and
wage rates, or individual demands for aggregated consumption, leisure or insur-
ance. Income wili, preferences, and the distribution of individuals by type i are
observable. The public insurer finances the uniform (linear) subsidy α with a
linear tax on income. Thus the public insurer’s instruments are (t,G, α) , where
t is the linear tax and G is a lump sum transfer. The public insurer maximizes
an utilitarian social welfare function and wants to redistribute from high- to
low-types. As before, the competitive insurance industry sells private contracts
(Pi, βi) to consumers. Private insurers do not observe consumers’ health status.
Profits are zero such that private premiums are fair (Pi = pβixi) .
Given (t,G, α, βi, Pi) , consumers maximize their utility with respect to labor
and treatment:
max
xi,li
pU
£
(1− t)wili +G− Pi − (1− α− βi)xi − h¯+ h (xi)− v(li)
¤
+(1− p)U [(1− t)wili +G− Pi − v(Li)]
Considering consumers’ first-order conditions, labor supplies and treatment de-
mand respectively verify:
lIi = l
0
i = l
∗
i (wi, t) : (1− t)wi = v0(li) (16)
x∗∗i = xi (α+ βi) : h
0 (xi) = 1− α− βi (17)
Labor supply is the same in both health status and is, obviously, negatively
aﬀected by the tax t
¡
∂li
∂t < 0
¢
. Moreover, more productive consumers supply
more labor (lH > lL) and have a higher post-tax revenue: WH ≡ (1− t)wH lH >
WL ≡ (1− t)wLlL. As before, there are no income eﬀects in the demand for
treatment, as a consequence, if consumers are not insured or if they have the
same private coverage, both types choose the same quantity of treatment.11
Let us consider the utilitarian optimum of the model. When the public
insurer observes both the consumers’ type and the health status, he solves the
following problem:



max
T Ii ,T
0
i ,li,x
P
i λi
©
pU
£
wili + T Ii − xi − h¯+ h (xi)− v(li)
¤ª
+(1− p)U
£
wili + T 0i − v(li)
¤
s.t. : p
P
i λiT
I
i + (1− p)
P
i λiT
0
i = 0
Obviously there is no role for the private market because the utilitarian optimum
leads to full insurance: CIi = C
0
i for i = L,H. Moreover, 0 > T
0
L > T
0
H and
11Notice that income eﬀects in treatment demand would reinforce the results. In fact, here
the focus is on the case where coverage is a normal good: the high income group buys more
coverage and consumes more treatment.
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T IL > T
I
H > 0, that is, the high type consumers pay a higher premium in good
health and receive a lower transfer when ill. As in the case without insurance,
labor supply and treatment quantity are not distorted: lFBi is such that wi =
v0(li) for i = L,H, and xFB is such that 1 = h0 (x) . Notice that, because
∂
∂li
[wili − v(li)] > 0, in the no-insurance case C0H > C0L and CIH > CIL, for i =
L,H. The no-insurance allocation and the utilitarian optimum are represented
in figure 4.
Insert figure 4 about here
Notice that, if the low-income group and/or the wage diﬀerence (wH − wL)
are suﬃciently high, or if the risk aversion is suﬃciently low, the high-income
group is better oﬀ with the no-insurance allocation than with the utilitarian
optimum.
3.1 With the public insurer only: the second best
When only the public firm provides coverage, the public insurer solves the fol-
lowing problem:



max
t,G,α
P
i λi
©
pU
£
(1− t)wili +G− (1− α)x− h¯+ h (x)− v(li)
¤ª
+(1− p)U [(1− t)wili +G− v(Li)]
s.t. : t
P
i λiwili −G− pαx = 0 (δ)
h0 (x) = 1− α
(P4)
where δ is the Lagrangian multiplier for the budget constraint.
Notice that, when public coverage is uniform, both income groups consume
the same treatment quantity.
From first-order conditions with respect to G and α :
αSB =
(1− p)x
P
i λi
£
U 0(CIi )− U 0(C0i )
¤
∂x
∂α
P
i λiE [U
0
i(C)]
The optimal uniform cost-sharing parameter αSB depends on the average dif-
ference between marginal utilities. All the considerations on the parameter α
made in lemma 2 in section 2.1, also hold here.
3.2 Stage 2: the private insurance market
Given (t,G, α) and anticipating the consumers’ choice, private insurers solve the
following program:



max
βi,Pi
pU
£
(1− t)wili +G− Pi − (1− α− βi)xi − h¯+ h (xi)− v(li)
¤
+(1− p)U [(1− t)wili +G− Pi − v(Li)]
s.t. : Pi = pβixi
h0 (xi) = 1− α− βi
(P5)
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Remark 4 in section 2.2 still holds: consumers always choose a private coverage.
Substituting Pi in the objective function of P5 and calculating the first-order
condition with respect to βi, again private coverage verifies:
βi =
(1− p)xi
£
U 0(CIi )− U 0(C0i )
¤
∂xi
∂βi
E [U 0(Ci)]
(18)
Corollary 1 directly follows from remarks 3 and 4.
Corollary 1 Let us assume that U 000 (·) > 0. When moral hazard is suﬃciently
high such that C.1 holds, the high-income group buys more private coverage than
the low-income one (βH > βL). When moral hazard is low such that C.1 is not
satisfied, the opposite holds (βL > βH).
Empirical evidence shows that moral hazard is relatively higher in the case
of ambulatory care and specialist services. The previous corollary suggests that
the rich are likely to buy more supplementary coverage for such services than
the poor. This is in line with Doorslaer et al. (2000) who find a pro-rich bias
in the use of specialist services.
3.3 Public and private coverage when the public insurer
is myopic: reverse redistribution
As in the subsection 2.2, let us consider the consequences of moral hazard on
public budget when the public insurer is myopic, that is when it does not an-
ticipate that consumers also purchase a private coverage. The public insurer’s
budget constraint is as in program P4: t
P
i λiwili − G − pαx∗ = 0 where
x∗ = x(α).
Remark 8 Under condition C.1, when the public firm is myopic and the private
firm also provides coverage, 0 < αSB < αSB + βi < 1 holds, with βH > βL.
Thus x∗∗i = x (α+ βi) with x
∗∗
H > x
∗∗
L > x
∗.
Let us consider again the coverage externality inflicted on the myopic pub-
lic firm. The tax t is not high enough to cover health care cost: the public
firm makes negative profit. In particular the public deficit is now equal to
pα [λH (x∗∗H − x∗) + λL (x∗∗L − x∗)]. Notice that reverse redistribution arises if:
twH lH − pαx∗∗H < twLlL − pαx∗∗L (19)
where twili − pαx∗∗i is one group’s net contribution to health care financing,
that is the fiscal revenue raised from that group minus the eﬀective health
care subsidy pαx∗∗i paid to such a group. Reverse redistribution arises when
high types’ net contribution is lower than low types’ one.12 Rearranging (19):
12Obviously public deficit has to be financed in subsequent periods. If we assume that
public deficit will be covered with a lump sum tax or that consumers live only one period,
reverse redistribution is not aﬀected by future taxation.
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t (wH lH − wLlL) < pα (x∗∗H − x∗∗L ) . Thus the higher is moral hazard and/or the
lower is the wage rate diﬀerence and the more likely is reverse redistribution.
Notice that this analysis does not consider income eﬀects in the demand for
treatment. Income eﬀects would increase the diﬀerence (x∗∗H − x∗∗L ) and make
reverse redistribution even more likely.
Some recent works present supplementary coverage as one source of the
increase in rich people’s medical expenses and the cause of serious inequity in the
delivery of medical care (Doorslaer et al. 2000 and Henriet and Rochet 1998)13 .
As stated above, this seems to be true in particular for specialist services whose
demand is more elastic with respect to coverage and it is characterized by higher
income eﬀects. Again this model does not take into account adverse selection.
Nevertheless, as mentioned in the introduction, it has been shown that with both
adverse selection and moral hazard, public insurance may want to set either a
tax or a subsidy on health care expenses (Petretto 1999, Boadway et al. 2002,
2004). In the real world mixed health insurance schemes are characterized by
a positive public insurance coverage. According to the literature about social
insurance and redistribution, a positive public coverage is welfare improving if
the negative correlation between wage rates and morbidity is suﬃciently high.
When such a negative correlation is low and considering health services where
moral hazard is high, as shown in this section, reverse redistribution really
becomes an issue.
Let us consider expected aggregate consumption. C0i = (1− t)wili + G −
Pi− v (li) and CIi = (1− t)wili+G−Pi− v (li)− (1− α− β)x∗∗i − h¯+h (x∗∗i )
where G = tE(wl)− pαx∗ and Pi = pβix∗∗i . Expected consumption with mixed
coverage and a myopic public insurer is (1− t)wili + tE(wl)− v (li)− pX∗∗i +
pα (x∗∗i − x∗) instead of (1− t)wili+tE(wl)−v (li)−pX∗∗i and, again, the bud-
get constraint moves down less than it should for both income groups. Anyway
the coverage externality imposed by the high-income group is higher than the
one imposed by the low-income one.
Remark 9 Under condition C.1, the coverage externality imposed by each in-
come group on the myopic public insurer is: pα (x∗∗i − x∗) , where pα (x∗∗H − x∗) >
pα (x∗∗L − x∗). Reverse redistribution (twH lH − pαx∗∗H < twLlL − pαx∗∗L ) can
arise if moral hazard is suﬃciently high and/or the wage rate diﬀerence is suf-
ficiently low.
3.4 Sequential game
In the case of heterogenous consumers, the simultaneous game between the
public and the private firm is no more interesting. In fact here there is no
symmetry between the two firms. On one side, public coverage is uniform while
the private one is not. On the other side, public coverage is financed through
linear taxation, while the private one is financed by a type-dependent premium.
13Doorslaer et al. (2000), page 572, write: "higher income groups may have better or
quicker access to certain services because they are more likely to have supplementary private
insurance cover, as in Finland, Sweden, the UK and in the US for Medicare patients".
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Therefore let us consider only the game where the private firm has the first-
mover advantage and correctly anticipates the second stage in which consumers
buy private coverage.
Proposition 3 When consumers are heterogeneous, condition C.1 holds, and
the public insurer has the first-mover’s advantage:
(i) public coverage is negative,
(ii) the high-income group purchases more private coverage than the low-
income one; both groups are under-insured with respect to the second-best: α+
βi < α
SB.
Proof. (i) See the appendix 5.5.
(ii) According to first-order condition (18) and corollary 1 βH > βL > 0. As
shown in the appendix 5.5, public coverage leads to less than complete crowding-
out of private insurance
³
−1 < dβidα < 0
´
. Concerning aggregate coverage, this
implies that ∂(α+βi)∂α = 1+
dβi
dα > 0. Thus, even if a reduction in public coverage
makes private one increase, aggregate coverage always decreases. The previous
considerations imply that each income group is less insured than in the second-
best.
The above-mentioned result is not surprising. The aim of the public in-
surer is to redistribute from high- to low-income group and insurance coverage
is provided by the private market as well. Moreover, public coverage is con-
strained to be uniform whereas private coverage is type-dependent, this implies
that the latter is a more eﬃcient instrument to smooth consumption. It was
assumed that moral hazard is suﬃciently high to make the high-income group
buy more coverage. As a result, high-revenue consumers are better insured
and purchase more treatment. A uniform positive public coverage would favor
the high-income group more than the low-income one and reverse redistribu-
tion could arise. With the taxation of health care expenses, on the contrary,
the public insurer indirectly taxes private coverage purchase and increases the
level of redistribution. In fact, tax revenue is now given by the sum of in-
come and health care taxation and the following inequality is trivially verified:
twH lH − pαx∗∗H > twLlL − pαx∗∗L .
4 Concluding remarks
This paper investigates the topping-up scheme in health insurance when both
public and private firms use linear contracts. The insurance relationship is char-
acterized by ex-post moral-hazard: insurance coverage induces overconsumption
of care. Considering a normative approach, in the first part of the paper the
optimal public coverage is derived when consumers are homogeneous and, in
the second part, when they diﬀer in their wage rate. In the case of homogenous
consumers, when the firms play simultaneously, both coverages are positive and
consumers are over-insured; whereas, when the firms play sequentially, the pub-
lic insurer provides zero coverage and the second-best allocation is implemented.
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In the case of heterogeneous consumers it is shown that, when moral hazard is
suﬃciently high, the rich buy more private coverage than the poor, and thus
the rich induce more over-consumption of care. As a consequence, when the
two firms play sequentially, the optimal public coverage is negative: health care
consumption must be taxed to discourage private policy purchase. As a result,
consumers are under-insured.
The paper also shows how reverse redistribution in public health care financ-
ing can arise. Let us assume that (i) the negative correlation between mortality
and wage rate is not high enough to justify a positive public coverage, (ii) insti-
tutional and/or political constraints on public policy exist such that the public
firm cannot provide a negative coverage and (iii) the level of ex post moral haz-
ard is suﬃciently high. Then, the rich net contribution to health care financing
(the fiscal revenue raised from the rich minus the health care subsidy paid to
them) is lower than the poor one. Unfortunately this scenario could describe
some real situations in countries like France and the US for Medicare patients.
Some authors have suggested diﬀerent ways to make the rich pay for their
overconsumption of care. In particular Henriet and Rochet (1998) suggest to
apply an income-related deductible to deal with the overly generous coverage
of the well-oﬀ. Whereas Pauly (2000), referring to Medicare, more radically
claims that the public insurance program should be substituted by a voucher
for all beneficiaries for paying non-governmental insurers. The US are already
partially moving in this direction: some Medicare subscribers can ask for the
voucher and use it to buy an HMO plan (this option is called Medicare+Choice).
The Medicare HMO plan is able to avoid the ineﬃciency associated with the
supplementation externality of Medigap because it provides all coverage through
a single plan and discourages supplementation. Moreover, in order to deal with
the income eﬀect, Pauly suggests making the size of both the voucher amount
and the minimum covered benefit decrease with income. This would allow a
reduction in coverage and moral hazard-related use of care for people who are
not poor.14
A policy implication of this present paper is that, when the public in-
surer is constrained to subsidize health care consumption because of polit-
ical/institutional reasons, the progressivity of contributions to public insur-
ance should be increased with the specific purpose of neutralizing the reverse-
redistribution eﬀect of voluntary private coverage. Moreover, tax incentives for
the purchase of private supplementary policies should be avoided.
References
[1] Barigozzi F. (2004), ”Reimbursing Preventive Care”, Geneva Papers on
Risk and Insurance Theory 29, 165-186.
14Nevertheless, with vouchers, there is no role for public insurance and the advantages in
terms of eﬃciency and redistribution emphasized by the literature about social insurance and
redistribution would be lost.
20
[2] Blomqvist, A. and P-O. Johansson (1997), “Economic eﬃciency and mixed
public/private insurance”, Journal of Public Economics 66, 505-516.
[3] Boadway R., M. Leite-Monteiro, M. Marchand, P. Pestieau (2002), ”So-
cial Insurance and Redistribution”, in S.Cnossen (ed.), Public Finance and
Public Policy, New Yourk: Mc Millan.
[4] Boadway R., M. Leite-Monteiro, M. Marchand, P. Pestieau (2004), ”Social
Insurance and Redistribution with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection”,
CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4253.
[5] Cremer, H. and P. Pestieau, “Redistributive Taxation and Social Insur-
ance”, International Tax and Public Finance 3(3), 281-95.
[6] Doorslaer, E. et al. (2000), “Equity in the Delivery of Health Care in Europe
and the US”, Journal of Health Economics 19(5), 553-83.
[7] Ettner, S.L. (1997), “Adverse Selection and the Purchase of Medigap In-
surance by the Elderly” Journal of Health Economics 16(5), 543-62.
[8] Gerdtham, U.G. et al. (1992), “An Econometric Analysis of Health Care
Expenditure: A Cross-Section Study of the OECD Countries”, Journal of
Health Economics 11(1), 63-84.
[9] Globerman, S. and A. Vining (1998), “A Policy Perspective on ”Mixed”
Health Care Financial Systems of Business and Economics”, Journal of
Risk and Insurance 65(1), 57-80.
[10] Henriet D., Rochet J.C. (1998), “Is Public Health Insurance an Appropriate
Instrument for Redistribution?”, mimeo University of Toulouse.
[11] Manning W.G., Newhouse, J.P., Duan, N., Keeler, E.B., Liebowitz, A. and
Marquis, M.S. (1987), “Health insurance and the demand for health care;
evidence from a randomized experiment”, American Economic Review, 77,
251-77.
[12] Marquis, M.S. and C.E. Phelps (1987), “Price Elasticity and Adverse Se-
lection in the Demand for Supplementary Health Insurance”, Economic
Inquiry 25(2), 299-313.
[13] Pauly, M.V. (2000), “The Medicare mix: eﬃcient combinations of social
and private health insurance for US elderly”, Journal of Health Care Fi-
nance 26 (3), 26-37.
[14] Petretto, A. (1999), “Optimal Social Health Insurance with Supplementary
Private Insurance”, Journal of Health Economics, 18(6), 727-45.
[15] Selden, T.M. (1997), “More on the economic eﬃciency of mixed pub-
lic/private insurance”, Journal of Public Economics 66, 517-523.
21
[16] Wagstaﬀ, A. and E. Doorslaer (1992), “Equity in the Finance of Health
Care: Some International Comparisons”, Journal of Health Economics
11(4), 361-87.
[17] Wolfe, J.R. and J.H. Goddeeris (1991), “Adverse selection, moral hazard,
and wealth eﬀects in the Medigap insurance market”, Journal of Health
Economics 10, 443-459.
5 Appendix
5.1 The concavity of problem P1
Before calculating the second order condition of P1, let us consider the demand
for treatment as defined by (4). By diﬀerentiating (4) it follows that:
dx
dα
= − 1
h00 (x)
> 0 (20)
Thus, d
2x
dα2 =
d
dα
³
− 1h00(x)
´
= h
000(x)
[h00(x)]2
dx
dα . Which leads to:
d2x
dα2
= − h
000 (x)
[h00 (x)]3
> 0 (21)
The second-order condition of P1 with respect to α can be written as:
pU 0 (CI)
³
−2p ∂x∂α +
∂x
∂α − pα
∂2x
∂α2
´
+ pU 00 (CI)
¡
−px− pα ∂x∂α + x
¢2
+(1− p)U 0 (C0)
³
−2p ∂x∂α − pα
∂2x
∂α2
´
+ (1− p)U 00 (C0)
¡
−px− pα ∂x∂α
¢2 (22)
A suﬃcient condition for (22) to be negative is: ∂x∂α − pα
∂2x
∂α2 < 0. Using (20)
and (21) the previous inequality can be rewritten as:
∂x
∂α
1
x
< p
α
x
∂x
∂α
h000 (x)
[h00 (x)]2
or:
− 1
h00 (x)
1
x
< pεx,α
h000 (x)
[h00 (x)]2
(23)
From (23) the condition in lemma 1 can be immediately derived.
5.2 Insurance coverage as a normal good
By totally diﬀerentiating the first-order condition of problem P1 with respect
to α andW it follows: dαdW = −
dFOCα
dW
dFOCα
dα
, where the denominator is negative under
the condition in lemma 1 and:
dFOCα
dW
= (1− p)x [U 00(CI)− U 00(C0)]− α
∂x
∂α
E [U 00(C)] (24)
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Since sign
¡
dα
dW
¢
= sign
¡
dFOCα
dW
¢
, the sign of (24) is crucial. Rearranging (24),
dFOCα
dW is positive if:
εx,α >
(1− p) [U 00(CI)− U 00(C0)]
E [U 00(C)]
5.3 Proof of Remark 7
The cross derivative of consumers’ expected utility in program P3 is:
∂2EU
∂α∂β = pU
0 (CI)
³
−p ∂x∂β +
∂x
∂β − pα
∂2x
∂α∂β
´
+pU 00 (CI)
¡
−px− pα ∂x∂α + x
¢ ³
−pα ∂x∂β + x
´
+(1− p)U 0 (C0)
³
−p ∂x∂β − pα
∂2x
∂α∂β
´
+(1− p)U 00 (C0)
¡
−px− pα ∂x∂α
¢ ³
−pα ∂x∂β
´ (25)
Notice that, considering consumers’ demand for treatment, ∂x∂β =
∂x
∂α > 0
and ∂
2x
∂α∂β =
∂2x
∂α2 > 0. The third and the fourth term in (25) are negative. The
first term is negative when the condition in remark 1 is verified. The second
term can be rewritten as:
pU 00 (CI)
µ
−pα∂x
∂β
+ x
¶2
− p2xU 00 (CI)
µ
−pα∂x
∂α
+ x
¶
which is negative if −pα ∂x∂α + x < 0. Rearranging the previous inequality it
follows that εx,α > 1p is a suﬃcient condition to have
∂2EU
∂α∂β < 0.
5.4 Proof of proposition 2
In the third stage, treatment demand is given by equation (7) and x∗∗ = x(α+
β). The indirect utility function is v = v(T + P, α+ β). Applying the envelope
theorem it follows:
∂v
∂T
=
∂v
∂P
= −E [U 0(C)] , ∂v
∂α
=
∂v
∂β
= xpU 0(CI) (26)
In the second stage the private insurer solves program (P2) where contract (α, T )
is taken as given and consumers’ behavior is correctly anticipated. Program (P2)
can be written using the indirect utility function v = v(T + P, α+ β) :
max
β,P
£ = v(T + P, α+ β) + λ [P − pβx (α+ β)] (27)
The first-order conditions are:
P : ∂v∂P + λ = 0
β : ∂v∂β − λ
³
px+ pβ ∂x∂β
´
= 0
(28)
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Since the solution to problem (27) gives β(α, T ) and P (α, T ), the maximum
value function for this problem is defined as V (α, T ). By the envelope theorem,
from (26) and the first-order conditions (28), it follows the properties of V (α, T ):
∂V
∂T =
∂v
∂T =
∂v
∂P = −λ
∂V
∂α =
∂v
∂α − λpβ
∂x
∂α =
∂v
∂β − λpβ
∂x
∂β = λpx
(29)
Finally in the third stage the public insurer solves program:
max
α,T
£ = V (T, α) + γ [T − pαx (α, T )]
The first-order conditions are:
T : ∂V∂T + γ
¡
1− pα ∂x∂T
¢
= 0
α : ∂V∂α − γ
¡
px+ pα ∂x∂α
¢
= 0
(30)
Using (29) and rearranging (30):
α
µ
∂x
∂α
+ px
∂x
∂T
¶
= 0 (31)
Notice that ∂x∂T = −
∂x
∂W , then
∂x
∂α+px
∂x
∂T =
∂x
∂α−px
∂x
∂W where
∂xC
∂α ≡
∂x
∂α−px
∂x
∂W
corresponds to the derivative of the compensated demand for treatment. In
fact, treatment demand is x∗∗ = x [α+ β (α, T )] , and an increase in α aﬀects x
both directly and indirectly through a change in β. By diﬀerentiating treatment
demand it follows that ∂x∂α+px
∂x
∂T = −
1
H00(x)
³
1 + ∂β∂α − px
∂β
∂W
´
which is diﬀerent
from zero.15 As a consequence, from (31) α = 0.
5.5 Proof of proposition 3
In the third stage, labor supply is given by equation (16) and treatment demand
by (17). The indirect utility function is vi = vi(t,G−Pi, α+βi) where i = L,H.
Applying the envelope theorem:
∂vi
∂t = −wiliE [U 0(Ci)]
∂vi
∂G = −
∂vi
∂P = E [U
0(Ci)]
∂vi
∂α =
∂vi
∂βi
= xipU 0(CIi )
(32)
In the second stage, private insurers solve program (P5) where (t,G, α) are
taken as given and consumers’ behavior is correctly anticipated. Program (P5)
can be written using the indirect utility function vi = vi(t,G− Pi, α+ βi) :
max
βi,Pi
£i = vi(t,G− Pi, α+ βi) + µi [Pi − pβixi (α+ βi)] (33)
The first-order conditions are:
Pi : ∂vi∂Pi + µi = 0
βi :
∂vi
∂βi
− µi
³
pxi + pβi
∂xi
∂βi
´
= 0
(34)
15A similar expression can be found in Boadway et al. (2001).
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Since the solution to problem (P5) gives βi(t,G, α) and Pi(t,G, α), the maxi-
mum value function for this problem is defined as Vi(t,G, α). From equations
(32) and (34), using the envelope theorem it follows:
∂Vi
∂t =
∂vi
∂t = −wiliE [U 0(Ci)]− µipβi
∂xi
∂t
∂Vi
∂G =
∂vi
∂G = −
∂vi
∂Pi
= E [U 0(Ci)] = µi
∂Vi
∂α =
∂vi
∂α − µipβi
∂xi
∂α =
∂vi
∂βi
− µipβi ∂xi∂βi = µipxi
Finally, in the third stage the public insurer solves program:
max
t,G,α
£ =
P
i
λiVi(t,G, α) + γ
·
t
P
i
λiwili(t)−G− pα
P
i
λixi(t,G, α)
¸
(35)
The first-order conditions are:
t :
P
i λi
∂Vi
∂t + γ
£P
i λiwili + t
P
i λiwi
∂li
∂t − pα
P
i λi
∂xi
∂t
¤
= 0
G :
P
i λi
∂Vi
∂G + γ
£
−1− pα
P
i λi
∂xi
∂G
¤
= 0
α :
P
i λi
∂Vi
∂α + γ
£
−p
P
i λixi − pα
P
i λi
∂xi
∂α
¤
= 0
(36)
Rearranging first-order condition with respect to G:
P
i
λi
·
µi
γ
− 1− pα∂xi
∂G
¸
= 0
Let us define bi ≡ µiγ −pα
∂xi
∂G the net marginal social utility of income for type-i
consumers. From the previous equation:
E(b) = 1 (37)
It is well known in the optimal taxation theory that when bH < bL redistributing
income from type-H to type-L is socially desirable.
Using (37) and rearranging first-order condition with respect to α:
E [bx]−E(x)− α
P
i
λi
µ
∂xi
∂α
− pxi
∂xi
∂G
¶
= 0 (38)
where, as in appendix 5.4, ∂x
C
i
∂α ≡
∂xi
∂α − pxi
∂xi
∂G corresponds to the derivative
of the compensated demand for treatment for type-i consumers. Equation (38)
can be rewritten as:
α =
cov [b, x]P
i λi
∂xCi
∂α
(39)
Presumably it is bH < bL, while, under condition C.1, xH > xL. Thus cov [b, x] <
0.
Let us analyse the sign of ∂x
C
i
∂α . What follows is adapted from Boadway et
al. (2001).
From appendix 5.4 derives that ∂x
C
i
∂α ≡
∂xi
∂α −pxi
∂xi
∂G = −
1
H00(x)
³
1 + dβidα − pxi
dβi
dG
´
.
In order to find the sign of ∂x
C
i
∂α it is necessary to calculate the expressions for
dβi
dα
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and dβidG from the second stage, that is from the maximization of expected utility
by the private firm. Notice that the result concerning strategic substitutability
of section 2.3 can be used even here. In fact, also in the sequential game the
private firm maximizes consumers’ expected utility given (t,G, α) . Under the
condition in remark 7, ∂
2EU
∂α∂β < 0 holds when the derivative of private coverage
with respect to the public one is considered. Thus, dβidα < 0. While, according to
remark 3, dβidG > 0. First-order condition (18) can be rewritten as:
∆i = U 0(CIi )xi −E [U 0 (Ci)]
µ
xi + βi
∂xi
∂βi
¶
(40)
By totally diﬀerentiating (40) it follows:
∂∆i
∂βi
dβi +
∂∆i
∂α
dα+
∂∆i
∂G
dG = 0
such that:
dβi
dα
= −
∂∆i
∂α
∂∆i
∂βi
and
dβi
dG
= −
∂∆i
∂G
∂∆i
∂βi
where ∂∆i∂βi < 0 when condition in lemma 1 holds, such that
∂∆i
∂α < 0. Taking
into account that in stage three dxidα =
dxi
dβi
and d
2xi
dα2 =
d2xi
dβ2i
= d
2xi
dαdβi
:
∂∆i
∂G
= U 00(CIi )xi − E [U 00 (Ci)]
µ
xi + βi
∂xi
∂βi
¶
> 0 (41)
∂∆i
∂α
= pβi
dxi
dα
∂∆i
∂G
+
dxi
dα
U 0
¡
CIi
¢
+ xiU 00
¡
CIi
¢ ·
xi − p
µ
xi + βi
∂xi
∂βi
¶¸
−E [U 0 (Ci)]
µ
dxi
dα
+ βi
∂2xi
∂α∂βi
¶
(42)
∂∆i
∂βi
=
∂∆i
∂α
− pxi
∂∆i
∂G
− ∂xi
∂βi
E [U 0 (Ci)] (43)
From (43) ∂∆i∂βi <
∂∆i
∂α < 0. Thus, −1 <
dβi
dα < 0 : public coverage leads to
less than complete crowding-out of private insurance. Notice that, concerning
aggregate coverage, ∂(α+βi)∂α = 1 +
dβi
dα > 0 holds. This means that, even if an
increase in public coverage makes private coverage decrease, aggregate coverage
increases as well.
Finally, using the expression in (41), (42) and (43), 1 + dβidα − px
dβi
dG can be
rewritten as:
1−
∂∆i
∂α
∂∆i
∂βi
+ pxi
∂∆i
∂G
∂∆i
∂βi
=
− ∂xi∂βiE [U
0 (Ci)]
∂∆i
∂βi
> 0.
As a consequence ∂x
C
i
∂α is negative as the denominator in (39). Thus public
coverage is negative.
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